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I. INTRODUCTION 
Military analysts have consistently had difficulties determining the size of defense 
activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1991, the Central Intelligence 
Agency estimated the Chinese defense budget to be $12 billion (in 1990 dollars), 
however, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimated a figure 
of $51 billion for the same year. In 1990, ACDA estimated that the cost of China's 1989 
defense activities was $24 billion. In 1994, the ACDA changed their 1989 estimate to 
$49 billion. Rand corporation analysts placed the spending estimate for 1990 at $63 
billion, while a recent Foreign Affairs article estimated the Chinese defense outlay at $90 
billion. 1The World Military Expenditures Project of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) stated in 1992 that actual Chinese defense spending was 
anywhere from "two to four times higher" than official figures, and ended up with a 
range from $12 billion $25 billion.2 
It is thus difficult to devise a satisfactory formula for estimating China's defense 
expenditures that can be used for comparison with similar expenditures of other 
countries.3 By simply converting the official 1993 figures as provided by the People's 
Republic (from renminbi to dollars), the resulting figures are as shown in Fig. 1: 
Figure 1 would make it appear as if China's defense budget is much less than that 
of the U.S. and most Western European countries. It appears to be slightly higher than 
that of India, while less than that of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Gregory G. Hildebrandt, The Size and the Burden of Defense Activities; China 
and the Soviet Union,(unpublished), 1993. 
2 SIPRI Yearbook 1993, PP.387. 
Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter April-May 1994, pp.13. 
- ----------------------------------------. 
As the PRC possesses the third largest number of military aircraft,4 an army in 
excess of three million personnel, and at least twenty-six successfully orbited satellites, 







USA France U.K. Genna Japan S.Kore Taiwan PRC India 
Figure 1. Selected Defense Budget (Billion of 1993 US$) 
Source: The Military Balance 1993-1994 
There is, however, another defense indicator that measures the total assets in 
inventory called the military capital stock. These assets include military equipment (such 
as tanks and planes), military facilities (such as headquarters and supply depots), and the 
war reserve spares, ordnance, and other stocks that are held in inventory.5 As estimates 
4 Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter April-May 1994, pp.14. 
Gregory G. Hildebrandt, Services and Wealth Measures of Military Capital 
(Measures of Military Capital), Defense Economics, 1990, Vol. 1, pp.159-176. 
2 
for China's defense budget are so unreliable, adapting the capital stocks method holds 
the potential for improving one's understanding of the size of China's military activities. 
This thesis uses The Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization 
(TASCFORM), developed to assess U.S. weapons performance, to measure the 
performance levels obtained by the weaponry of the various services of China's military.6 
In addition to providing an indicator of weapon performance, there is also a systematic 
relationship between the weapons scores and dollar cost of U.S. weapons. Therefore, the 
T ASCFORM methodology can be used to estimate the dollar cost of the weapon systems 
of Chinese military. 
To understand the capabilities of the Chinese military, it is helpful to understand 
how the People's Liberation Army's ( PLA) command and management structure 
operates. Therefore, this thesis will first discuss the command and management of the 
PLA in Chapter II. Chapter III analyzes the PLA's ground forces. By using the 
TASCFORM relationship between performance and cost, the dollar cost of major 
weapons systems is estimated. Major weapons, such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, 
artillery, and helicopters are in the ground forces category. Chapter IV also uses 
T ASCFORM technique to explore the performance scores and cost of the PLA's aircraft. 
In the air force category, bombers, fighters, and helicopters are analyzed. Chapter V 
analyzes the PLA's naval forces. Since T ASCFORM does not provide a relationship 
between its performance scores and cost for naval vessels, a cost estimating relationship 
(CER) is employed. China started its space program in the late 1950's. Chapter VI, then, 
will discuss the development of Chinese space activities. Finally, Chapter VII presents 
the author's conclusions. 
6 TASCFORM provides static indicators of military force potential called Weapons 
System Performance (WSP). 
3 
4 
II. COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PLA 
Since leadership in China is highly concentrated at the top, an understanding of 
their command and management structure is helpful for determining China's overall 
military capabilities. This chapter will discuss the main command structure of the PLA. 
The focus of this investigation is structure, defense technology, and interrelationships 
between departments of the PLA. 
A. THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
The Central Military Commission ( CMC) commands the central role in the Chinese 
defense establishment. The CMC consists of a chairman, one or two co-chairmen, a 
chief secretary, one to three co-secretaries and some staff. In 1982, the PRC established 
the National Military Commission (NMC) to distinguish commands from CMC. 
However, the NMC is staffed with the same individuals as the CMC; it is believed there's 
no functional distinction between these two organizations.7 The CMC supervises three 
main departments, the Headquarters of General Staff, General Political Department and 
General Logistics Department. These three officers conduct the day-to-day affairs of the 
PLA. The CMC also directly commands seven Military Regions, the Navy, the Air 
Force, the Second Artillery Corps, direct subordinate troops, military academies and 
National Technology Departments. Army forces are deployed into Provincial Military 
Area Commands, Sub-Military Area Command, Garrison Commands and Guard 
Commands. The organization chart of the PLA is shown in Fig. 2. 
Paul Humes Folta "The Defense Industry of The People's Republic of China: 
Command Structure, Industries, Production, And Foreign Trade", Mobilization Concepts 
Development Center. pp.3. 
5 
CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
I I I 
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Source: People's Republic of China Year Book, 1992/1993 
B. THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
rn 1982, to create an impression of "military nationalization", the People's Republic 
of China amended its constitution to create a new command system, the National 
Military Commission (NMC) of the PLA. However the members of the NMC are also 
members of the CMC. Therefore, there is no functional distinction between these two 
organizations. However, since the PRC's military reorganization in 1989, some 
differences have arisen between the two organizations. As to whether the two 
organizations continue to differ apart will require additional information and analysis. 
c. THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
The PLA's Ministry of National Defense (MND) once held supreme command 
over it's military. rn the past, with the assistance of the general departments, it 
managed the military budget, conscription and demobilization, and coordinated defense 
production with the National Defense Industries Office. Since the establishment of the 
National Defense Science, Technology & Industry Commission (NDSTIC) in 1982, the 
MND lost some of its command and policy-making functions. Later, the MND lost 
most of its remaining power as it was placed in a position below the CMC Secretary 
General. As a Central Committee member, rather than a Politburo member, the head of 
the MND lost considerable influence. The present role of the MND is not very clear; 
however, it seems that the MND is dealing with only reciprocal affairs between CMC 
and the State Council and holds no practical military command power. 
D. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & 
INDUSTRY COMMISSION 
The Chinese have made a senes of organizational attempts to build a 
self-sustaining defense industrial base. The National Defense Science, Technology & 
Industry Commission (NDSTIC) is apparently the product of this attempt. NDSTIC 
reports directly to the CMC, and possesses the authority equal to a commission of the 
State Council. Because of its close ties to China's research and development institutes, 
7 
and because it maintains a large staff, the NDSTIC plays a key role in the Chinese 
defense industry. 8 
The NDSTIC also controls important technical programs such as the civilian and 
military nuclear program, and the space program. Reports reveal that the NDSTIC is 
also in charge of the import and export of defense products. 9 
E. GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT 
The General Staff Department (GSD) is primarily m charge of the training, 
mobilization, communications, operations, intelligence, armament, acquisition of 
equipment, and mapping and survey. The GSD Central Headquarters controls the service 
arms headquarters and the service sector headquarters. The service arms headquarters 
include the PLA-Navy Headquarters and the PLA-Air Force headquarters. The Second 
Artillery in charge of ballistic missiles, is likely to be under the GSD's administration. 
Since GSD controls a large number of staff, and partially because of its many 
responsibilities 10, the GSD possesses a high degree of influence among the three 
departments. 
F. GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT 
The General Logistics Department (GLD) has responsibility for weapons and 
ammunition supplies, maintenance, transport facilities and the military medical services. 
Separate air force and naval logistics organizations are also under the supervision of the 
GLD. Evidence has revealed that the PLA's military-run businesses are getting larger in 
recent years. One of the military-run businesses, named "China Hsin-Hsin 
Corporation", 11 is a consolidation trust that runs various commercial activities in the 
Paul Humes Folta "The Defense Industry of The People's Republic of China: 
Command Structure, Industries, Production, And Foreign Trade", Mobilization Concepts 
Development Center,pp.17 -19. 
9 People's Daily revealed in 1992, One of the military-run businesses called 
"Hsau-Fen Corporation" which belongs to NDSTIC mainly undertakes the imports and 
exports of the military hi-techs. 
10 The same as IO,pp.86. 
8 
engmeenng and technical development fields. is owned by the GLD. In addition to 
military necessities, factories supervised by the GLD also produce non-military 
products such as clothing and household goods. 
G. GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 
The General Political Department (GPD) can be considered a bureau that is 
designed to secure centralized control over the military. However, the GPD deals mainly 
with ideological affairs, financial inspections, and supervision of the PLA's operational 
and technical training. It also conducts sports, culture, and entertainment for the armed 
forces. 12 The key person in the system is the political commissar. He links together the 
functions of the political departments and the party committees and is responsible for the 
relationship and interaction between the military and civil society. Political commissars 
seem to be coequal in rank and responsibility with the military commander. 13 Although 
debates on democracy have increasingly arisen in the military, the GPD still holds a 
special status in the PLA. 
H. ARMED FORCES 
Despite the fact that PLA troops are expected to obey orders coming from the top, 
military leaders possess key roles on many strategic decisions. It is for this reason that 
the leaders of the PRC are always simultaneously in charge of the CMC and hold 
command authority over the troops. 14 
11 According to the People's Daily revealed in 1992, China Hsin-Hsin corporation 
had made a pre-taxed profits of 1.5 billion Yuan and its total imports and exports was 
2.66 billion Yuan in 1991. This corporation is still absorbing foreign investments and has 
more than 17 joint businesses up to now. 
12 Paul H. B. Godwin, "Development of The Chinese Armed Forces", The 
Political-Military Affairs Division Airpower Research Institute, pp.40. 
13 Paul H. B. Godwin "The Chinese Communist Armed Forces", The 
Political-Military Affairs Division Airpower Research Institute, 1988. 
14 In June 1994, Jiang,Zemin, the president of PRC and the head of the CMC, 
promoted 19 officers to full generals which was believed to establish his leadership over 
military. 
9 
The PLA is divided into seven Military Regions, seven Military Air Regions and 
three Fleet Commands. 15 Based on territorial boundaries, the Military Regions are 
divided into Beijing Command, Shenyang Command, Lanzhou Command, Ji'nan 
Command. Nanjing Command, Guangzhou Command, and Chengdu Command as 
shown on Fig. 3. The Military Air Regions are also deployed on the same base of 
territorial boundaries as Military Regions; its headquarters is located in Beijing. 16 Naval 
forces are deployed into three fleet commands: East Sea Fleet Command, South Sea Fleet 
Command and North Sea Fleet Command. Later chapters will further discuss the PLA's 
force structure and the capital value of its major weapons. 
15 Same as 15, pp.45. 
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Figure 3. Chinese Military Region 
Source. The Military Balance 1993-94 
12 
III. GROUND FORCES 
The Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) possesses about 2.3 million personnel 
deployed in seven Military Regions. The PLA has a total of 93 infantry divisions, 1 0 
armored divisions, and 68 local divisions. Table 1 shows a summarized subordinates and 
deployment of each Military Region. 
MILITARY 
REGION POSITION SUBORDINATES 
Including Helongjiang, Jiling and Liaoning Military Districts. 
SHENYANG NORTHEAST Possesses three armored divisions. 18 infantry divisions and 17 
CHINA local divisions including two to three divisions of border defense 
units. 
Hebei and Shandong Military Districts. Possesses five armored 
BEIJING NORTH divisions. 28 infantry divisions and 12 local divisions. 
CHINA 
Gansu. Ningxia, Qinghai and Shanxi Military Districts. Possesses 
LANZHOU NORTHWEST six infantry divisions and eight local divisions, including two to 
CHINA three divisions of border defense units. 
Sichuan and the Tibet, Guizhou, and Yunnan Military Districts. 
CHENGDU SOUTHWEST Possesses 15 infantry divisions and 11 local divisions, including 
CHINA two to three divisions of border defense forces. 
Gungdong, Guangxi, Hainandao, and Hunan Military Districts. 
SOUTH Possesses 12 infantry divisions and 11 local divisions, including 
GUANGZHOU CHINA two to three divisions of border defense forces. 
EAST Shandong Military District. Possesses one armored division, eight 
JINAN CHINA infantry divisions, and three local divisions. 
EAST Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang Military Districts. Possesses one 
NANliNG CHINA armored division. six infantry divisions and six local divisions. 
Table 1. Force Deployment of The PLA Army 
Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS Report 5 May 1994. 
13 
The PLA's major weapons include 9,500 tanks, 14,500 artillery pieces and field 
guns, tactical ground to ground missiles, and combat helicopters. A summary of the total 




T-69(MOD Type-59) 800 
T-34/85 700 
LIGHT T A.."i"K: 
Type-63 AMPH 1,200 
Type-62 800 
APC: Type-53 and others 2,800 
TOWED ARTY: 
130nun: Type-591-95 1,000 
155nun: WAC-81 30 
152nun: Type-54/66/83 1,400 
122nun: Type-54/60/83( d-30) 6,000 
lOOmrn Type 59186 6,070 
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY: 15,000 
Table 2. PLA's Major Ground Weapons 
Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 
A. ARMORED WEAPON SYSTEMS 
The Analytic Science Corporation (TASC) concluded that the cost of the U.S. 
main battle tank is roughly proportional to performance. 17 The measure of performance, 
the Weapon System Potential (WSP) of each system, is evaluated by calculating the basic 
performance characteristics, including: (1) main gun and/or missile payload, (2) weapon 
range, (3) system maneuverability, and (4) system mobility. 18 The linear graph of the 
relationship between unit costs (in constant fiscal year 1981 dollars) for all armor and 
artillery system is shown in Fig. 4. The estimated cost and performance of China's 
17 TASC report, "Assessing U.S. weapon system modernization cost and performance trends", 29 April 
1985. 
18 See T ASC pp.6-2. 
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armored weapon systems (main battle tanks, light tanks and armored personnel carrier) is 
Table 3 as follows: 
(In 1993 thousand $) 
Weapon System 
Item Potential Number Unit Cost Capital Value 
MBT 
Type-59 5.863 6,000 827.75 4,966.500 
T -69(MOD T-59) 5.948 800 850.325 680,260 
T-34/85 10.082 700 1,444.8 1,011,360 
Light Tank 
Type-63 AMPH 6.103 1,200 872.9 1,047,480 
Type-62 4.787 800 617.05 493.640 
A.PC Type-53! and others 2.135 2.800 316.05 884,940 
Total 9,084.180 
Table 3. Tanks 
The above data reveals the capital value of China's armor weapons (l\1BT , light 
tanks and APC) is approximately $9.08 billion in 1993 dollars.(a purchase deflator of 
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Figure 4. Cost vs. WSP forArmor and Artillery 
Source: TASC Report 29 April, 1985 
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B. ARTILLERY WEAPONS 
T ASC measures artillery WSP by its (I) payload weight, (2) weapon range, and 
(3) system mobility19 The cost and performance of China's artillery weapons ( towed 
artillery and ADA) are as follows: 
(In 1993 thousand dollars) 
Weapon System 
Item Performance Number Unit Cost Capital Value 
Towed ARTY 
lOOmm 8.4965 6,070 376.25 2,283.837.5 
l22mm 9.3583 6,000 391.3 2,347,800 
l30mm 10.906 1,000 451.5 451,500 
152mm 10.344 1,400 436.45 611,030 
155mm 19.613 30 842.8 25,284 
AD ART 35/57/85/lOOmm 6.627 15,000 285.95 4,289,250 
Total 10,008,701.5 
Table 4. Artillery 
To estimate the cost, the relationship for U.S. self-propelled artillery of Fig. 4 is 
employed. Note that the single observation for U.S. towed artillery indicates that a lower 
cost may be applicable. Therefore, the estimated artillery cost of Table 4 may be 
somewhat overstated. 
The data indicates that the capital value of China's artillery weapons is 
approximately $10.01 billion ( 1993 dollars). 
19 See TASC pp.5-2. 
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IV. AIR FORCE 
The PLA Air Force possesses about 470,000 personnel deployed in seven Military 
Air Regions. They have approximately 470 bombers, 4,000 fighters, 485 transport planes, 
290 reconnaissance planes and about 1, 100 helicopters. A summary of the PLA' s major 
air force weapon systems as Table 5. 
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Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 (including Army Air and Navy Air) 
A. COST AND PERFORMANCE SCORES 
The Analytic Science Corporation (T ASC) generates weapon system potential 
(WSP) by its basic system measurement of effectiveness reflecting ( 1) payload, (2) aircraft 
range, basing modes, and standoff weapon range, (3) maneuverability, and (4) speed. 
Figure 5 shows cost vs. performance of U.S. aircraft (attack, fighter, bomber, and patrol 
aircraft) on the same trend line20 . Reconnaissance and transport planes are not included in 
this cost to performance relationship. Therefore, their costs are not calculated. The cost 
and performance of China's air force (bomber, FGA, fighter, and helicopters) are shown in 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 respectively. 
20 The slope of the trend line is 0.76. See TASC report 'Assessing U.S. Weapon System Modernization 
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B. BOMBERS 
The PLA possesses two types of bombers: medium H-6 and light H-5. The H-6 
medium type bomber shows higher performance scores than the light H-5. The total 
capital value of bomber weapon systems is calculated as approximately $5. 18 billion in 
1993 dollars (a purchase deflator of 1. 53 3 is applied, refer to Table 18). The cost and 















(In 1993 million dollars) 






In the PLA's fighter wing category, J-type aircraft still dominates the inventory 
numbers. Due to age, performance of these J-type aircraft are relatively low. The 
acquisition of SU-27 fighters had increased total performance scores; however, the 
numbers of these more modem aircraft are still limited. The cost and performance scores 
are shown as follows: 
(In 1993 million dollars) 
Weapon System 
Item Model Performance Number Unit Cost Capital value 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FGA Q-5 5.180 600 7.6436 4,586.16 
Fighters 
J-5 4.311 440 6.304 2,773.76 
16/B/D/E 6.063 3,500 8.671 30,348.5 
J-7 3.862 550 5.516 3,033.8 
J-8 5.679 110 8.195 901.45 
SU-27 17.321 20 22.064 441.28 
SU-27B 17.321 4 22.064 88.256 
Total 42,173.206 
Table 7. Fighters 
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The total capital value of the fighters IS approximately $42.2 billion ( 1993 
dollars) 
D. HELICOPTERS 
Helicopters reveal low performance scores in the aircraft category. There are ten 
types ofhelicopters in the PLA's aircraft inventory. A total capital value is approximately 
$785 million ( 1993 dollars) The cost and performance scores are summarized as follows: 
(In 1993 million dollars) 
Weapon System 
Model Performance Number Unit Cost Capital value 
AS-332 1.21 6 1.396 8.378 
BELL-214 1.23 4 1.399 5.598 
MI-17 1.14 28 1.308 36.624 
S-70C-8 1.15 44 1.311 57.684 
MI-8 1.15 30 1.311 39.33 
Z-5 0.98 290 1.259 365.11 
Z-6 1.01 100 1.277 127.7 
Z-8 1.22 15 1.398 20.97 
Z-9 1.13 90 1.30 117 
SA-348 0.719 8 0.8 6.4 
Total 784.794 
Table 8. Helicopters 
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V. NAVAL FORCES 
The PLA Navy possesses about 260,000 personnel (including 25,000 in aviation, 
25,000 in coastal defense units and 5,000 naval infantry) deployed into three fleet 
commands: East Sea Fleet Command, South Sea Fleet Command and North Sea Fleet 
Command. They have one nuclear-fueled ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), forty-six 
tactical submarines of various types, fifty-six principle surface combatants, some 1,500 
coastal combatants, one hundred and eight-five mine sweepers (mine countermeasure 
vessels), four hundred and twenty-one amphibious landing craft, approximately one 
thousand naval aircraft, and other miscellaneous support and systems. A summary of the 
PLA's naval weapon systems is shown in Table 9. 
Type Nomenclature 
Submarine: 
Strategic SUB: SSBN 
Tactical SUB: 
Table 9. 
SSN: HAN with 533mm IT 
SSG: modified ROMEO 
SS: type ESSE 
ES3B 
SLBM( trials): 





























MCM: SOY T --+3 MSO 35 
WOSAOMSC 5 
Lienyun AUX MSC 80 
Fushun MSI 5 
Drone MSI 60 
Amphibious Craft: 
Yukan LST 3 









Fuging AO 2 
AOT 33 
AF 4 
SUB SPT 10 
SUB Rescue 
Repair 2 




Ocean Tugs 25 
TRG 
Miscellaneous: LT TPT AC 60 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 
In the previous chapters, we applied the T ASCFORM technique in analyzing the 
relationship between cost and performance scores of the PLA' s ground and air forces. 
However, for naval forces, the cost estimating relationships employed by the U.S. 
Department ofDefense (DOD) is preferable. DOD has used Cost Estimating Relationships 
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(CER) depicting the association between cost and full-load displacement of each major 
category of U.S. ship21 . This CER technique first determines the full-load of each type of 
ship and then applies a specific formula to obtain an estimated cost. In this chapter, 
therefore, I will use the CER method to estimate the cost of the PLA' s major naval 
weapon systems (Submarines and Surface Combatants). 22 Not all categories of naval 
vessels will be examined using this method; small craft, amphibious landing craft, and 
support vessels are not included in this study. 
A. SUBMARINES 
CER calculates cost of U.S. submarines by the following formulae: 
0.0780 
(1). For SSBN, C = 392e 
(2). For SS and SSG, C =46 + 45.3D 
(3). For SSN, C = 206 + 45.3D 
where C = estimated cost in millions of 1983 dollars and D = submerged displacement in 
thousands of tons. 
The 1983 dollar figure was deflated to 1993 dollars using the Navy's Total 
Obligational Authority (TOA) Purchases Deflators23 (1.42). Using the formulae described 
above, Table 10 shows the numbers and capital value ofthe PLA's submarines. The total 
cost ofthe PLA's submarines is $10.7 billion (1993 dollars). 
21 The results of the analysis are reported in the FY 1986 Department of Defense Program for Research 
Development and Acquisition, Statement by the Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, 
to the 99th Congress First Session, 1985,pp.v-6. DoD employs CERs discuss in an Institute for Defense 
Analysis study, Cost Estimating Relationships for U.S. Navy Ships, by William J.E. Shafer. 
22 Naval Aircraft are analyzed as part of the air forces of the PLA, and are included in the previous 
chapter. 
23 U.S. Weapon Systems Costs, 1994. Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi, Fourteenth Edition, Data Search 
Associates, refer to Table 19 for navy deflator. 
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( In millions of FY 1993 U.S. dollars) 
Type Full Load Displacement Number Cost per Ship Capital Value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategic SUB: SSBN 8.000 1.039.79 1.039.79 
Tactical SUB: 
SSN: HAN 5.000 5 614.15 3.070.75 
SSG: modified ROtvfEO 1.650 171.46 171.46 
SS: type ES5E lA75 6 160.20 961.20 
ES3B 1.475 33 160.20 5.286.60 
Soviet Golf: 2,350 216.49 216.49 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total -P 10.746.29 
Table 10. Numbers and Capital Value of PLA's Submarines 
Source: The Military Balance 1993-94 pp. 123 and Jane· s Fighting Ships 1993/1994 pp. 115 -l38 
B. PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 
CER calculates cost of U.S. surface combatants by the following formula: 
(1). For class OOG and FFG, C = 86.1+ 41.20 
(2). For class FF, c = 11.1 + 37.80 
where C = estimated cost in millions of 1983 dollars and 0 = ship full load displacement in 
thousands of tons. 
Like submarines, the 1983 dollar figure of ships was deflated to 1993 dollars by 
the same factor (1.42). Table 11 shows the numbers and capital value ofthe PLA's major 
surface combatants is as shown in Table 11. 
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(in millions of 1993 dollars) 
Type Full Load Displacement Number Cost Per Ship Capital Value 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destroyer: DDG 
Luhu 4,200 367.98 367.98 
modified Luda 3,670 2 336.97 673.94 
Luda 3,670 15 336.97 5,054.55 
Frigate: FFG 
Jiangwei 2.250 2 253.90 507.80 
Jianghu (Type-!) 1,702 18 221.84 3,993.12 
Jianghu (Type-H) 1,820 9 228.74 2,058.66 
Jianghu (Type-III. IV) 1.924 5 234.82 U74.10 
Jiangdong 1,924 234.82 234.82 
Chengdu 1,460 3 207.68 623.04 





Numbers and Capital Value of PLA's Principal Surface Combatants 
Source: The Military Balance 1993-94 pp. 123 and Jane"s Fighting Ships 1993/1994 pp. 115 -138. 
The PLA' s major surface combatants show a total capital value of $15.2 billion 
( 1993 dollars). 
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VI. SPACE PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched it's first successful artificial orbiting earth 
satellite, Sputnik 1. Three months later, the U.S. launched it's first satellite (Explorer 1) 
into orbit. Since then, thousands of satellites have been placed into orbit, and space has 
become a new battlefield for the superpowers. As the technology to build space-launch 
vehicles is closely akin to that for long-range ballistic missiles, the U.S. and the former 
USSR had long been the only two countries that had the capabilities to launch satellites. 
However, in 1970, China successfully launched its first satellite, the China 1, thus 
breaking the two-nation monopoly on space research. Among categories of satellites, 
Earth Observation Satellites are used to obtain photographs of military value, such as 
detection of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space, ballistic-missile launch 
sites, and ship and troop movements. Since satellite use has broad military applications, 
developing space programs can be considered one element of military activities. This 
chapter will discuss the development of China's space program, which has been 
distinguished by many achievements since it's inception. 
B. HISTORY 
China began her space program in the late 1950's. In 1970, China launched its first 
satellite the China 1. In 1975, China for the first time successfully recovered one of it's 
satellites from space. In 1987, China began to provide commercial satellites for sale to 
foreign countries, and hence entered into the launch services market in competition with 
the US, the former Soviet Union and the European Space Agency. By the end of 1993, 
China had made at least 26 launches, successfully placed more than 50 satellites into 
orbit. 
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C. DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES 
China has developed five series of carrier rockets: the Long March No. 1, Storm 
No. 1, Long March No. 2 (including model 2c and 2e), Long March No. 3 and Long 
March No. 4. China's satellite launch sites are at the Jiuquan Satellite Center for oval 
orbit satellites, the Xichang Satellite Center for geostationary satellites, and the Taiyuan 
Satellite center for solar stationary satellites. Table 12 shows China's space activities 
chronologically since 1970. 
Table 12. China's Space Launches 
Name Launch Launched Launch Weight Purposes Life Span Remarks 
Date By Site 
China 04/24/70 Long Jiuquan 173 kg communication 100 years China's first 
1 March 1 satellite 
China 03/03/71 Long Jiuquan 221 kg sc1ence 3028 days 
2 March 1 
China 07/26/75 Long Jiuquan 3500 kg 50 days 
3 March 2 
China 11126175 Long Jiuquan 3500 kg 33 days First satellite 
4 March 2 recovered 
China 12116/75 Long Jiuquan 3500 kg 42 days 
5 March 2 
China 08/30/76 Long Jiuquan 270 kg 817 days 
6 March 2 
Long Jiuquan 3600 kg 1 section 
12/07/76 March 2 recovered 
China after 3 days, 2nd section 
7 stayed in 
space for a 
further 23 
days 
China 01/26/78 Long Jiuquan 3600 kg 12 days recovered 
8 March 2 
China 06119/81 Long Jiuquan astrophysics 7, 382,332 Launch rocket 
9,10,11 March 2 days with 3 satellites 
respectively 
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China 09/09/82 Long Jiuquan 3600 kg reconnaissance 5 days recovered satellite test, 
12 March 2 remote sensing 
China Long Jiuquan 3600 kg possible 15 days recovered operational 
13 08/19/83 March 2 reconnaissance 
flight 
China Long Xi chang 900 kg experimental communications 
14 01/29/84 March 3 
Long Xi chang 900 kg communication 1 year First successful 





China Long Jiuquan 3600 kg presumed to be a 17 days recovered reconnaissance 
16 09/12/84 March 1 mission 
Long Jiuquan possible 17 days recovered 
10/21185 March 2 survey land China could 
resources. then provide 
China 
environmental foreign 
protection. customers with 
17 mineral both 
exploitation. geostationary 
forestry and Earth 
development resource 
launches 
China 02/01/86 Long Xi chang 900 kg communication 
18 March 3 
Long Jiuquan land 1 section 
10/06/86 March 2 surveillance. orbited 5 days 
mineral and then 
China 
prospecting. recovered in 
environmental Gansu. second 
19 protection. section orbited 
mapping and 17 days 
land use 
planning 
Long Jiuquan. scientific and 10 days recovered. this 
China 08/05/87 March 2 technological 






China 09/09/87 Jiuquan science 
21 
China 09/08/88 Long Taiyuan weather First 




China 04/08/90 Long Xi chang 1250 kg transmit TV, 10 years 
23 March 3 telephone, 
communicationS 
carry out First space 
sounding of sounding carrier 
01/20/91 the rocket ionosphere, 
testing 
development 









03/22/92 Long Xi chang failed. China's 




China 04/08/94 Long Xi chang weather failed 
26 March 1 satellite 
Source: "Space Programmes", "The PRC Year Book 1992/93". "The Administration's Decision to License the 
Chinese Long March Launch Vehicle- Hearings Committee on Science, Space, and Technology U.S. House of 
Representatives, Sep. 23 and 27, 1988". and various sources. 
D. ISSUES 
Because the Chinese are able to provide inexpensive satellite services, 24 it has 
been an attractive launch option for low cost commercial systems. Questions have also 
been raised about the manner in which this has gained for the Chinese access to certain 
types of Western satellite technology. China has responded that its capability to launch 
rockets is limited. However, due to their low cost, China has undoubtedly gained quite a 
significant place in the space field. One of their most noticeable events was the successful 
recovery of it's satellite following their fourth satellite launches on November 26,1975, 
for the point on China possessed the ability to use satellites to perform military missions. 
24 China Daily Report, June 3, 1986 reported "it was 10 to 15 percent less than the 
international rate of about 30 million dollars per geostationary launch". 
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It is difficult to determine how many military purpose satellites have been 
launched by China, Western analysts used to assume that the recoverable satellites -
China 4, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 19 - were reconnaissance or spysats. Typically, 
however, they were later evaluated as "Earth resources" satellites. However, even a 
research satellite (like land survey and mapping) can contribute to defense activities. 
E. CONSTRAINTS 
China claimed to increase launch activities from one to three times a year to as 
many as 10 annually.25 However, increased rocket development and launch needs are 
poorly met by their existing launch facilities. 26 China still has a need to construct 
additional launch pads to meet the expanding need of their missile launch capacity. 
China's secretive space program may have allowed them to hide failures records 
(e.g. unsuccessful launches, malfunctioning satellites). This had made insurers unwilling 
to insure satellites launched by the Chinese. Hence, foreign firms may hesitate to contract 
launch activities with China. 
China relies heavily upon U.S. satellite technology. Additionally, many satellites 
that are launched by China are provided by U.S .. In 1988, the Bush Administration made 
a decision to grant export licenses that allowed for Chinese launching of US-made 
satellites on a case-by-case basis. 27 As a result, China's satellite program depends, in part, 
on U.S. support. 
F. CONCLUSION 
China's attempts at marketing launch vehicle services have met with some success. 
However, the degree to which China markets for commercial satellites in competition 
with the United States and Europe depends on several important factors. 28 First, U.S. 
decisions on whether U.S. satellites can be exported to China could determine the success 
25 China Daily Report, June 6, 1986. 
26 There is one launch pad at Xichang, second one had likely been built. 
27 
"The Administration's Decision To License The Chinese Long March Launch Vehicle", 
Hearing before the Committee on Science, Space, And Technology U.S. House of representatives 
on hundredth congress, second session, September 23 and 27, 1988 no.145. pp.382. 
28 Same as 27, adapted from pp.414-415. 
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or failure of the Chinese effort. Another factor is the degree to which China is willing to 
invest in expanding launch vehicle production rates and providing additional ground 
supports. China tries to make profits from commercial satellites, which is a way of 
obtaining funds for developing their space program. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis discussed the PLA's ( 1) command structure, (2) major weapon systems, and 
(3) space activities. A determination of the capital value for the major equipment of each arm of 










ARMY AIR-FORCES NAVY 
Figure 6. Capital Value of China's Military Services Major Equipment 
The capital value of the ground forces (including main battle tanks, light tanks, APCs, 
towed artillery, and air defense artillery) is calculated $19 billion (1993 dollars). The capital value 
of air force (including bombers, FGA, fighters, and helicopters) is approximately $42 billion (1993 
dollars). The capital value of naval forces (including submarines and principal surface combatants) 
is approximately $26 billion ( 1993 dollars). 
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AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis applied the TASCFORM technique to analyze the cost of China's major anny 
and air force weapon systems. For naval forces, cost estimating relationships (CERs) are 
employed. Consistency, however, might be lost. If T ASCFORM could extend its analysis of the 
relationship between cost and the WSP for naval forces, it would be worthwhile to refine the 
capital value of the naval component of the PLA 
Some weapons are not examined, such as reconnaissance and transport planes in the air 
force category, patrol and coastal combatants in the naval category, miscellaneous equipment like 
trucks and guns and strategic missile forces. Cost estimating relations might be employed to 
estimate the dollar cost of these equipment types. 
This study concentrates on the capital value of the PLA's order of battle. However, it is 
also important to understand the level of operating and support costs associated with the 
equipment. The dollar size of the operating and support activities would provide an indicator of 
the readiness of the PRC's military. 
China's space development and activities are discussed in this study. Additional research 
would help one better understand which satellites support military activities and what the dollar 
cost of these military space activities equals. 
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Appendix A 
THE TASCFORM-ARMOR MODEL 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
The T ASCFORM-ARMOR model is a technique that allows for measurement of 
the effectiveness for armored vehicles (tank), armored personnel carriers (infantry 
fighting vehicles) and other close combat systems. Combat vehicles with heavy weapon 
systems (20mm or larger and armored personnel carriers with heavy machine guns) are 
considered by this model. 
Baseline System 
The baseline system selected for the TASCFORM-ARMOR model is the M-60Al 
main battle tank. This selection was made based on: 
1. Wide deployment throughout the 1965 to 2005 time period. 
2. First major variant of an important series. 
3. Near state-of art at time of introduction. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
The Weapon Potential (WP) measures of effectiveness reflecting: 
--Main gun and/or missile payload 
-- Weapon range( s) 
--System maneuverability 
--System mobility 
The WP formula in TASCFORM-ARMOR is: 
WP = (FPL X (PLgun + PLmsi)) + [F WR X ((PL:~:;Lms/) X WRgun + (PL;~:;Lms/) X WRmsl)] 
+(FM xM)+(FSM x SM) 
where 
PLgun =Number of rounds carried for tank and antitank guns, recoilless rifles, and 
unguided rocket launchers divided by 63 rounds, the M-60Al baseline 
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value. For light automatic cannons (::; 30mm ), the number of rounds carried 
is divided by 100 before normalizing to account for burst firing 
PLmsl =Number of missiles carried divided by 63 rounds, the baseline value 
WRgun =Maximum effective gun/unguided rocket range (i.e., where Ph= 0.50 for 
best round) in km divided by 1.8 km, the M-60A1 value 
WRms = Maximum missile range in km: 1.8 km 
M =System battlefield maneuverability, expressed in KW/tonne divided by 
14.9 kw/tonne, the baseline value. (For manpack systems, an average 
well-conditioned adult male is assumed capable of 3.0 kw/tonne output). 
SM = System mobility, the best road speed in kph divided by 48 kph, the 
M-60A1 value. (For manpack systems, that same adult male is assumed 
capable of 6. 0 kph on a sustained basis). 
F xx = Weighting factors for system characteristics, where 
4 
L Ft.T= 10 
XX=! 
XX= Basic system characteristics, ie., payload (PL), weapon range (WR) 
system maneuverability (M), and system mobility (SM). 
TASCFORM-ARMOR is unique in its factoring of platform maneuverability into 
its calculations for ground combat systems. Mobility is also considered an important part 
of the calculation for indirect fire artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) systems, as 
their ability to accompany their support forces is a crucial factor in their employment. 
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The values of systems characteristic weighting factors (F xx) are shown in Table 
13. Scenario sensitivity is considered a critical factor in the validation of the model. 
While the nominal values are calculated with an eye toward high intensity conventional 
warfare on the plains of Central Europe, weights are considered for cases involving desert 
warfare (a Mideast scenario) and restricted range cases. 
Table 13 Potential Characteristic Weighting Factor (F xx) Value 
Weighting Factor Nominal Case Mideast Case Restricted Range Case 
Fpl 3 2 3 
Fwr 3 4 2 
Fm 2 2 3 




THE TASCFORM-ARTILLERY MODEL 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
The TASCFORM-ARTILLERY model measures the effectiveness of conventional 
indirect fire artille:ry systems. The weapon systems considered include artille:ry (field gun 
and tube artille:ry cannon), high trajecto:ry fire motars, multiple rocket launcher systems 
(MRLs ). Systems may be employed by either land-based Army or Marine forces, or as 
part of the on-board arsenals of Naval forces. Targets could ostensibly be engaged either 
at land or sea. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
The Weapon Potential (WP) measures of effectiveness reflecting: 
-- Payload weight 
-- Weapon range 
--System mobility 
Artillery Roles 
TASCFORM-ARTILLERY differentiated between land and sea based systems in 
the following manner: 
I. Land-based systems are designated as self-propelled (SP) tube systems, towed or 
fixed tube systems, or MRL systems. 
2. Sea-based systems are tube or MRL only. 
Artille:ry System Considered the full set of major ground forces and naval tube and 
MRL systems of 20mm bore diameter and greater. 
Baseline system 
The value of Fxx, as in all other T ASCFORM models, is a subjective 
determination, based on expert analysis of the systems. The attribute weighting factor 
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values Fxxr) for land- (tube artillery and MLRs) and sea-based systems used m 
TASCFORM-ARTILLERY are shown in Table 14. 
The Weapon Potential (WPr) measures of effectiveness for artillery systems is 
formulated:: 
WPr = (FPLr xPL)+(FWR X WR) +(FSM, X SM) 
where 
r = Artillery role 
PL =Payload, the weight of a round in kg, divided by 43 kg (the M-109 baseline 
value for ground systems) or 32 kg (the MK 42 baseline value for sea systems). In the 
case of MRL, PL is determined by multiplying the weight of the rocket warhead by the 
number of ready rounds before normalizing to the baseline. This reflects the greater 
instantaneous frre power of MRL systems relative to tube systems. 
WR = Maximum weapon range using full charge or rocket assist, in km, divided 
by 14.6 km (the baseline value for ground systems) or 23.4 km (the baseline value for sea 
systems). 
SM =System mobility, expressed as best road speed in kph divided by 56 kph, the 
baseline. For towed or manpack systems, this speed is the best possible for the 
weapon/prime mover combination. For naval mounts and fixed land systems, SM = 0. For 
naval mounts, mobility is a function of the hulls upon which they are mounted. 
F x;..: = Weighting factors for system characteristics in role r, where 
3 L Fxxr = 10 
XX=l 
XX= Basic weapon characteristics, i.e., payload (PL), weapon range 
(WR), land system maneuverability (SM). 
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As in the other T ASCFORM models, F xxr values are determined subjectively. The 
values have been reviewed by an assemblage of experts. Table 14 shows F xxr values for 
the TASCFORM-ARTILLERY model. 
Table 14 Attribute Weighting Factor (F xxr) values 
Weighting Factor Land Based Tube Land Based MRL Land Based Sea 
Systems Systems Systems 
Fpl 4 5 5 
Fwr 4 ..
, 5 .) 




THE TASCFORM-AIR MODEL 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
Measures of effectiveness for individual aircraft, as well as tactical air forces 
groups, are produced by TASCFORM-AIR. Only those types of principal combat aircraft 
designed to deliver conventional munitions against air and surface targets are considered. 
Reconnaissance, ECM, F AC, and AEW aircraft are not considered. The model assumes 
the two major roles of considered aircraft to be air combat and surface attack. Table 15 
shows the standard missions within each of these two roles. 
AIR COMBAT SURF ACE ATTACK 
Fighter Close air support/ Heavy bomber 
Interceptor battlefield air 
interdiction Heavy air-to-










Table 15. Roles of Air Model 
Computing the measure of effectiveness for a single aircraft is a three-step 
process. First, the airframe, power plant, and payload characteristics are computed to 
determine a weapon potential score, which is then normalized against the U.S. F4B, the 
TASCFORM-AIR baseline aircraft. The impact of the various characteristics of the 
aircraft are weighted subjectively to the contribution made in an air combat or surface 
attack role. When a new model or modification of an existing aircraft significantly 
changes that aircraft's capabilities, the updated version is treated as a different aircraft. 
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Weapons system potential is computed by scoring on-board systems, such as weapons, 
navigation, and avionics. 
The method of computing measures of effectiveness for individual aircraft is 
summarized as follows: 
The Weapon Potential (WP) measures of effectiveness reflecting: 
--Payload 
-- Aircraft range, basing modes, and standoff weapon range 
--Maneuverability 
--Speed 
Weapon System Potential (WsPr) Air Combat Roles 
The Weapon System Potential is a measure of effectiveness determined by 
calculating the characteristics of payload, range, basing mode, missile standoff (as a 
factor in overall engagement range), maneuverability, and speed of the aircraft. These 
characteristics yield a score which is then normalized against the baseline aircraft, the 
U.S. F4B. The formula for WSP is expressed as: 
where 
WPr = (FPLr xPL)+(FRr X (R+BF +2MR))+(FMr xMr)+(Fvr X Vr) 
PLr =Payload expressed in number of air-to-air ordnance stations, including 1 for 
an internal gun, divided by 8, the F-4B normalizing value. 
R+BF+2MR= Maximum range (R) for a clean aircraft, using internal fuel only to fly a 
high-low-high mission profile; plus a basing factor (BF) of 200 km for 
V/STOL capability, 450 km for seaplane or STOL capability, or 750 km 
for CTOL or V/STOL shipboard basing capability; plus two times 
missile range for those aircraft capable of launching long-range air-to-air 
missiles (LRAAM), the sum divided by 1800 km, the F-4B normalizing 
value. The missile's range is doubled to represent the effective increment 
to aircraft range rather than to its radius of action 
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and 
Mr = Maneuverability of the aircraft, represented be excess specific power (P s ). 
In the fighter role Ps is divided by 122 meters/second, the F-4B 
normalizing value. In the interceptor role, P s is divided by 92 m/s, again 
the appropriate F-4B normalizing value 
Vr =Useful airspeed expressed in kph, in the air combat roles, divided by 1390, 
the F-4B normalizing value 
F PLr =Weighting factor for payload 
F Rr=Weighting factor for range (plus basing mode and twice missile range as 
applicable) 
F Mr =Weighting factor for maneuverability 
F vr =Weighting factor for useful airspeed 
L F rxx = 10 for any role. 
In varying roles, performance characteristics have obviously different relative 
values. For example, aircraft designed to fill a fighter role have different needs than those 
designed as interceptors (range, maneuverability, etc.). As a result, weighting factors for 
the four performance characteristics (PLr, R, Mr, and Vr) are necessary. The weighting 
factor values for aircraft filling air combat roles are shown in Table 16. 
Weighting Factor Fighter Interceptor 
Fplr 3 4 
FRr 2 3 
FMr ... 1 .) 
FVr 2 2 
Table 16. Performance Characteristic Weighting Factor Values, 
Air Combat Roles 
The WSPr term is additive rather than multiplicative based on the following logic: an 
aircraft in which each of the basic performance attributes, PLr, R, Mr, and Vr, are twice 
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those of a predecessor is considered to be twice as capable, and not 16 times as capable 
as it would be if the same attributes were considered multiplicative. 
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APPENDIX D 
TASCFORM WEAPON SYSTEM DATABASE 
The Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization (TASCFORM) is a series 
of weapon system assessment models developed to determine the relative performance 
characteristics of like types of military weapons. The models provide static indicators of military 
force potential. These measures of effectiveness are based on the characteristics and numbers of 
individual weapon systems. They are expressed as numerical scores. 
Individual weapon systems measures of effectiveness for aircraft, armor, artillery and other 
systems are determined by comparing payload, range, speed, maneuverability, targeting and 
guidance. and other characteristics to those of selected baseline weapon systems. The relative 
importance of these characteristics for each weapon system is calculated through use of a 
weighting, in which subjective factors were determined by panels of expert using Delphi 
techniques. These weapons system potential values can be used to determine individual system 
capability, or in the aggregate to show assumed force potential for an entire fleet or inventory. 
T ASCFORM, in its ability to determine measures of effectiveness for individual weapon 
systems (and to take into account such diverse factors as logistics, C3I, and personnel), can be 
used for a number of purposes. First, it can be used for conducting net assessments of current and 
future military balances within geographic regions. It can also help strategic and operational 
planners compare forces. Finally, systems analysis can use the model to study technological 
development and cost-performance measures. 
T ASCFORM assesses the military potential of the following types of ground systems for 
the years 1965 to 2005: 
• Air defense systems 
- T errninal air defense systems 
- Regional systems 
- Mobile air defense systems 
• Artillery systems 
- Self-propelled tube systems 
- Towed or fixed tube systems 
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- Multiple rocket launchers 
• Armor systems 
-Tanks 
- Armored personnel carriers 
- Command vehicles 
- Infantry fighting vehicles 
- Reconnaissance vehicles 
- Anti-tank weapon systems 
• surface to Surface Missiles 
- Ballistic guided missiles 
-Free rockets over ground 
T ASCFORM assesses the military potential of the following types of air systems for the 
years 1965 to 2005: 
• Air to ground air systems 
- Close air support aircraft 
- Interdiction aircraft 
• Air to air systems 
- Fighter aircraft 
- Interceptor aircraft 
T ASCFORM assesses the military potential of the following types of sea systems, by 
evaluating the platform separately from the weapon systems and then combining the scores. 
Weapon systems are assesses by weapon type and mission, for the year 1965 to 2005: 
• Non-ASW weapon systems 
-Guns 
-Missiles 
- surface to air missiles 
• ASW weapon systems 
- Ship platforms 
- Submarine platforms 
- Aircraft platforms 
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• Platform systems 
- surface platforms 
-Submarine platforms 




Fiscal R.D.T.&E. Procurement 
Year Aircraft Missiles Wep & Veh Ammo Other 
1973 31.2 27.9 28.4 28.2 32.8 33.6 
1974 34.4 30.8 31.0 31.1 35.1 36.8 
197") 17 9 13 3 11 L1 11 '\ 1R 6 19 R 
1976 40.6 35.8 35.9 36.0 41.5 42.8 
1977 44.2 39.6 39.8 39.9 45.7 47.3 
197~ AR () .11 R 4.1 1 ALi 1 AQ R SUi 
1979 52.7 48.7 49.1 49.3 54.4 56.2 
1980 57.9 54.2 55.1 55.0 58.9 60.4 
1981 62.5 59.9 60.6 60.7 62.8 63.7 
1982 65.8 64.5 65.2 65.2 66.0 66.3 
ffi 1983 68.3 68.2 68.4 68.5 68.4 68.5 
1984 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.6 70.7 
1985 
72.8 
72.8 72.8 72.8 72.8 72.9 
1986 74.9 75.1 75.0 75.1 75 0 75.2 
1987 772 77.7 77.8 77.8 77.7 77.9 
1988 80.1 80.8 80.9 80.9 80.5 81.0 
1989 83.3 83.9 84.1 84.1 83.7 84.0 
1990 86.7 86.9 87.0 87.0 86.6 86.9 
1991 89.7 
89.5 89.5 89.5 89.5 89.4 
1992 92.2 
91.9 91.9 91.9 92.0 91.9 
1QQ1 94 h 94.4 94.4 94.4 94.5 94.4 
1994 97.2 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 
1995 100.0 1000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1996 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 
--- - ---- ------- - ----· -
Table 17. DOD Deflators-Army 

























































Aircraft Missiles Other I 
29.0 28.9 31.7 
31.6 31.4 34.5 
34.1 33.8 38.1 
36.8 36.5 41.0 
41.2 40.8 44.8 
45.7 45.3 48.6 
50.9 50.8 53.1 
56.5 56.4 58.0 
61.5 61.6 62.4 
65.6 65.6 65.8 
68.5 68.4 68.3 
70.7 70.6 70.6 
72.9 72.8 72.8 
75.3 75.2 75.0 
78.1 78.1 77.4 
81.2 81.2 80.2 
84.2 84.2 83.4 
86.9 86.9 86.6 
89.4 89.4 89.6 
91.8 91.8 92.1 
94.3 94.3 94.6 
97.1 97.1 97.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
102.9 102.9 102.9 
Table 18. DOD Deflators-Air Force 
Source: U.S. Weapon Systems Costs, 1994 
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APPENDIX G 
Fiscal R.D.T.&E. Procurement 
Year Aircraft Weapons Ships Other M.C. 
1973 31.0 28.2 28.2 30.6 33.9 28.5 
1974 34.0 30.8 30.9 33.9 36.9 31.0 
1975 17 7 114 114 17 4 1Q Q 11 h 
1976 40.4 35.9 35.9 41.3 43.0 36.3 
1977 44.0 39.9 39.9 46.9 47.6 40.4 
1Q7R 47 7 44 0 441 <;1 7 <;? n 44 7 
1979 52.3 49.0 49.1 56.2 56.5 49.9 
1980 57.5 54.6 54.8 60.3 60.6 55.3 
1981 62.3 60.1 60.3 63.7 63.8 60.5 
1982 65.7 64.7 64.9 66.4 66.3 64.8 
fB 1983 68.2 68.2 68.3 68.6 68.5 68.1 
1984 70.6 70.0 70.7 70.9 70.7 70.7 
1985 72.8 
72.8 72.8 73.4 72.8 72.8 
1986 74.9 
75.1 75.1 76.0 75.2 75.2 
1987 772 77.8 77.8 78.7 78.0 78.0 
1988 80.0 80.8 80.9 81.5 81.1 81.0 
1989 83.2 84.0 84.0 84.1 84.1 84.0 
1990 86.6 86.9 86.9 86.7 86.9 86.8 
. 
1991 89.7 
89.5 89.5 89.2 89.4 89.4 
91.9 91.9 91.7 91.8 91.9 1992 92.2 94.4 94.4 94.3 94.4 94.4 1QQ1 Q4 h 
1994 97.2 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 
1995 100.0 1000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1996 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 
Table 19. DOD Deflators-Navy 



























ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY 
STORES SHIP WITH RAS CAPABILITY 
TANKER WITHOUT RAS CAPABILITY 
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
BOMBER 
COST ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP 
CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 
DESTROYER WITH AREA SAM 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
FIGHTER, GROUND-ATTACK 
FRIGATE 
FRIGATE WITH AREA SAM 
GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT 
GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT 
GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 
LIGHT TANK 
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
MAIN BATTLE TANK 
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 
MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE/MOTOR RIFLE 










NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & 
INDUSTRY COMMISSION 
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 
RECONNAISSANCE 
REPLENISHMENT AT SEA 
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE 
SUPPORT 
NUCLEAR-FUELED BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINE 
NUCLEAR-FUELED SUBMARINE 
SSGN SSN WITH DEDICATED NON-BALLISTIC MISSILE 
LAUNCHERS 
SS SUBMARINE 
SLBM SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE 
TASC THE ANALYTIC SCIENCE CORPORATION 
TASCFORM TECHNOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPARATIVE FORCE 
TPT TRANSPORT 
TRG TRAINING 
WSP WEAPON SYSTEM POTENTIAL 
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